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Abstract: Real-world agents do not know all consequences of what they know. But we
are reluctant to say that a rational agent can fail to know some trivial consequence of
what she knows. Since every consequence of what she knows can be reached via chains
of trivial consequences of what she knows, we have a paradox. I argue that the problem
cannot be dismissed easily, as some have attempted to do. Rather, a solution must give
adequate weight to the normative requirements on rational agents’ epistemic states, without
treating those agents as mathematically ideal reasoners. I’ll argue that agents can fail to
know trivial consequences of what they know, but never determinately. Such cases are
epistemic oversights on behalf of the agent in question, and the facts about epistemic
oversights are always indeterminate facts. As a result, we are never in a position to assert
that such-and-such constitutes an epistemic oversight for agent i (for we may rationally
assert only determinate truths). I then develop formal epistemic models according to which
epistemic accessibility relations are vague. Given these models, we can show that epistemic
oversights always concern indeterminate cases of knowledge.
Keywords: Bounded rationality, logical omniscience, epistemic possibility, knowledge,
rationality
1 Introduction
Here are some of the things I know. It’s currently sunny outside; Billy Bragg is on
the stereo; if it’s warm this afternoon the washing will dry; it’s warm this afternoon.
Do I know that the washing will dry? Of course! Do I know it’s sunny and Billy
Bragg is on the stereo? Of course! It’s tempting to systematise these remarks
by claiming that what I know is closed under trivial consequence (including
conjunction introduction and modus ponens). If knowledge is so closed, then that
must be in part due to the meanings of the logical constants ‘and’ and ‘if . . . then’.
It must be that the relationship between those meanings and inference rules such
as conjunction introduction and modus ponens dictates that one’s knowledge is
closed under those rules.
If so, then one’s knowledge must be closed under all the standard introduction
and elimination rules. For the standard rules for a connective stand to the meaning
of that connective just as conjunction introduction and modus ponens stand to
the meaning of ‘and’ and ‘if . . . then’. And, since those rules taken together form
a classically complete system of deduction, one’s knowledge must be closed under
(rst-order) consequence. I must know all logical consequences of what I know
and, as a special case, I must automatically know all logical truths, irrespective
of whether I’ve explicitly considered those propositions. Real-world agents are
not logically omniscient in this way, of course. Deductive reasoning is typically
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cognitively costly, often informative and sometimes surprising. We may know
the premises (or have assumed them for the purposes of argument), and yet the
conclusions we draw from them are often informative.
It seems that (i) rational agents seemingly know the trivial consequences of
what they know, but (ii) they do not know all logical consequences of what they
know. The problem of rational knowledge is that (i) and (ii) are incompatible.
Any (rst-order) logical consequence of a set of premises is derivable from those
premises via a chain of trivial inferences and so, if one does not know some
logical consequence of what one knows, then one must fail to know some trivial
consequence of what one knows. Let’s call such a case an epistemic oversight: a
particular case in which a given agent fails to know a particular trivial consequence
of what she knows. We can then express the problem of rational knowledge as
follows: real-world agents must suffer from epistemic oversights, yet we can never
attribute a particular epistemic oversight to an agent without thereby treating
her as being irrational. (The problem of rational belief is analogous: agents do
not believe all consequences of what they believe, yet a rational agent seemingly
cannot fail to believe some trivial consequence of what she believes. I’ll focus on
the knowledge case only here, but almost all of what I say carries over to the
doxastic case.)
My aim in this paper is to explore and provide a solution to the problem of
rational knowledge. I am not interested merely in the logical omniscience problem,
taken as a technical problem for a particular semantics for knowledge. The problem
of rational knowledge does not arise merely within a particular formal semantics:
it is not an artefact of a particular theoretical framework. (Notice how there
was no mention of possible worlds, propositions, deductively closed epistemic
possibilities or the like in setting up the problem.) The problem concerns the
nature of rational states quite generally. Discussing a similar problem, Stalnaker
remarks that:
The problem does not arise from any easily identiable philosophical dogma
which might be given up to avoid it. . . . the conclusion really derives not
from any substantive assumption about the source of knowledge, but from
the abstract concept of content or information. The difculty is [that] . . .
[w]hether the source of my information is my senses, authority, or a faculty
of intellectual intuition with access to a Platonic realm of abstract entities, its
deliverances are not news unless they might have been different. (Stalnaker
1984, 25)
Given I know that it’s sunny, and I know that Billy Bragg is on the stereo, it isn’t
news that it’s sunny and Billy Bragg is on the stereo. The move from conjuncts
(taken individually) to conjunction isn’t informative. Since it isn’t informative,
it seems I can’t learn anything new by explicitly reasoning from conjuncts to
conjunction; and this could be only because I already know the conjunction. So
the problem is quite general, and not the result of a particular semantic account.
The rest of the paper is set out as follows. In §2, I consider and reject several
attempts to diffuse the problem of rational knowledge. In §3, I draw a link between
the problem of rational knowledge and the sorties which, I claim, sheds light on the
2
problem (but does not solve it). In §4, I re-cast the problem in terms of epistemic
possibility. I argue that the epistemically possible worlds must include logically
impossible worlds, but that not all such worlds count as epistemic possibilities. In
§5, I consider a serious problem faced by any impossible worlds-based theory of
epistemic states (and of content in general). §6 presents formal models based on
the philosophical discussion from §4 and §5. §7 establishes some formal results
for the models presented in §6, including the main formal result of the paper: an
agent cannot determinately fail to know some trivial consequence of what she
determinately knows. §8 is a short conclusion.
2 Some Responses Dismissed
In this section, I consider two attempts to diffuse the problem of rational knowledge
by arguing that there is no rational requirement for an agent to know trivial
consequences of what she knows. The rst runs as follows. I know that A only if
I believe that A. And I may come to believe that such-and-such, which trivially
entails ‘A’, and yet not realise that ‘A’ follows. To make this concrete, suppose
I’m writing down a proof, from premises I believe. At some stage of the proof,
I’m in a position to infer ‘A’ easily at the next step. But my mind wanders; I don’t
write ‘A’; I don’t even consider whether A. According to this line of thought, this
kind of mental meander easily explains how I can fail to believe, and hence fail to
know, some trivial consequences of what I know.
This response focuses on a ne-grained notion of explicit belief. The view
might be put in terms of having sentence tokens (in the language of thought) in
the ‘belief box’. That picture of the mind is certainly questionable. But I needn’t
enter into those controversies here, for our ordinary concept of belief extends far
beyond this fairly restricted kind of explicit belief. When I make plans for next
week, one input to my mental process is my belief that the world won’t end before
next week; there’s also my belief that I won’t be abducted by aliens, or drafted
for a foreign war, before then. Of course, I don’t consider these matters explicitly,
for in cognitive terms to do so would be far too costly. Yet I believe all those
things (else I wouldn’t make those rather dull plans for next week); I believe them
implicitly. Indeed, by any reasonable standard, I know all those things.
A good (but fallible) test for implicit belief that A is whether the agent
(in sincere, attentive mood) would assent if asked whether A. Belief in trivial
consequences of what one believes seems to pass this test. Having inferred ‘A’
and ‘B’, one may then fail to make the trivial inference to ‘A ∧ B’ explicitly in
one’s mind but, if asked whether A∧ B, a sincere, attentive agent should assent.
Similarly for other trivial inferences. So that fact that one may fail to pay attention
to the trivial consequences of what one believes will not help to avoid the problem.
A different way to undermine the idea that a rational agent’s beliefs must be
closed under trivial consequence is to hold that an agent’s doxastic state may be
fragmented or divided into clusters. One may consider some matter in one ‘frame
of mind’, forming beliefs in one cluster, and later consider some unrelated matter
in some other frame of mind, forming beliefs in some other cluster. Lewis (1982),
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Fagin and Halpern (1988) and Stalnaker (1984) present versions of the idea. Lewis
motivates his version of it as follows:
I used to think that Nassau Street ran roughly east-west; that the railroad
nearby ran roughly north-south; and that the two were roughly parallel. . . .
So each sentence in an inconsistent triple was true according to my beliefs, but
not everything was true according to my beliefs. . . . My system of beliefs was
broken into (overlapping) fragments. Different fragments came into action in
different situations, and the whole system of beliefs never manifested itself all
at once. (Lewis 1982, 436)
We can view each of Lewis’s fragments as an individual belief state, so that an
agent’s total system of beliefs is divided into multiple (and perhaps overlapping)
states. On Stalnaker’s view, each of an agent’s multiple belief states corresponds
to a rational dispositional state:
A person may be disposed, in one kind of context, or with respect to one kind
of action, to behave in ways that are correctly explained by one belief state,
and at the same time be disposed in another kind of context or with respect
to another kind of action to behave in ways that would be explained by a
different belief state. This need not be a matter of shifting from one state to
another or vacillating between states; the agent might, at the same time, be
in two stable belief states, be in two different dispositional states which are
displayed in different kinds of situations. (Stalnaker 1984, 83)
An agent is then thought of as believing that A if and only if ‘A’ is true according
to at least one of the agent’s belief states. (Fagin and Halpern (1988) give the
formal details of this approach.) Then it may be the case that the agent believes
that A, and believes that B, but does not believe that A∧ B. This is the case when
‘A’ is true according to one of the agent’s belief states, ‘B’ is true according to
another, but both are true according to none of them. In this way, one may fail to
believe trivial consequences of one’s beliefs.
I’m quite sure that the kind of situation Lewis describes is commonplace,
and that the approaches Lewis and Stalnaker propose are reasonable models of
such situations. Yet it is implausible that whenever an agent does not believe
some consequence of what she believes, this is so because she hasn’t put the
relevant premises together. Consider again our agent, trying to complete a complex
derivation from some premises Γ = {‘A1’, . . . , ‘An’} (which, let’s suppose, she
believes). On the fragments of belief approach, she must either automatically
believe all consequences of Γ, or else entertain the ‘Ai’s in different belief clusters.
Both options are untenable. Given the task confronting her, she simultaneously
entertains all the ‘Ai’s in a single frame of mind (look! she’s written them all down
on her page!). And yet, contrary to the fragments account, she still fails to believe
(even implicitly) most of the consequences of Γ.
We can push the objection further. Suppose, having considered all the ‘Ai’s as
individual premises, she then forms (and believes) their conjunction, ‘A1 ∧ ⋯ ∧An’.
She must then believe all consequences of Γ, on the fragments of belief approach.
The picture is that all the agent’s deductive effort goes into combining the premises
4
into a single belief state, that is, in the relatively trivial deductive move from
‘A1’, . . . , ‘An’ to ‘A1 ∧ ⋯ ∧ An’. The move from ‘A1 ∧ ⋯ ∧ An’ to any logical
consequence of Γ then comes for free. But this is implausible. Our agent will fail
to believe almost all consequences of Γ, irrespective of whether she rst forms the
conjunction of the premises in Γ.
I’ve argued that the problem of rational knowledge is a genuine problem which
cannot be dismissed easily. In the next section, I offer my own analysis of the
problem.
3 Vagueness and Bounded Rationality
The problem of rational knowledge can be formulated in terms of a step-by-step
deduction D from premises Γ which the agent in question clearly knows, to a
conclusion ‘A’ that the agent clearly does not know. By assumption, not every step
of reasoning in D preserves the agent’s knowledge (since we eventually arrive at a
conclusion the agent does not know). Yet any attempt to say precisely at which
point in the deduction the agent’s knowledge gives out is doomed to failure (and
not merely because we can’t elicit a precise answer from the agent). The problem
is one of rationality. Wherever we locate the failure of knowledge in D, we will
ascribe to the agent a rational failure, namely the failure to know (even implicitly)
some trivial consequence of what she knows. (I’m assuming here, as seems correct,
that explicit deduction extends one’s knowledge.)
Formulating the problem in this way brings out its structural similarity with
the sorites paradox. In this case, the principle that rational agents know the trivial
consequences of what they know plays the role that tolerance conditionals play in
the sorites. The tolerance conditionals for ‘red’, for example, say that (in a sorites
series of colour samples), if sample n is red then so is sample n + 1. Clearly, not
all such conditionals are true; but we cannot say or discover which is false.
Suppose guests at a party are invited to take some number of sweets from a
box. The greedy guests are those who take many sweets, but there is no precise
number we can give to answer the question, ‘what is the minimum number of
sweets a guest could take, and thereby be greedy?’ Why can’t we give an answer,
even in principle? There must be a greatest n for which (in the context of the
example) ‘taking n sweets is greedy’ fails to be fully true. Perhaps for this n (and in
that context), ‘taking n sweets is greedy’ has some truth-value less that full truth;
perhaps it is neither true nor false (‘there is no fact of the matter’); perhaps it is true
on some but not all precisications of ‘greedy’; or perhaps it is straightforwardly
false. Regardless, there is a greatest such n, and which n that is (in that particular
context) has a lot to do with the meaning of ‘greedy’. So, in this sense, the meaning
of ‘greedy’ has some precision to it.
Had things (including our uses of ‘greedy’) been ever so slightly different, the
meaning of ‘greedy’ (together with the context) may have determined some other
least n for which ‘taking n sweets is greedy’ would fail to be fully true (in that
context). But we cannot epistemically discriminate between these possibilities,
and so we cannot know that n + 1 is the correct answer to ‘what is the minimum
5
number of sweets a guest could take, and thereby be greedy?’. (We can know that
the answer is in the vicinity of n: we know that taking, say, 3 sweets isn’t greedy,
whereas taking 1,000 is. The point is that we can have inexact knowledge only
(Williamson 1992).) As a consequence, we may not rationally assert the answer to
be n. For one should assert only what one knows, or at least, what one has good
reason to believe. In asserting ‘n is the minimum number of sweets a guest could
take and thereby be greedy’, one is thereby claiming some evidence in favour of n
in answer to the question, but one cannot have such evidence. In all such cases of
vagueness, we simply aren’t at liberty to make precise claims in borderline cases,
even if we happen (purely by chance) to hit on the truth. This is the phenomena
of unassertibility at the borderline.
The situation is very much the same in the case of rational knowledge
ascriptions. We cannot rationally assert that it is this particular trivial inference in
our deduction D which does not preserve the agent’s knowledge, even if that is the
truth. Given the argument above, there must be some such trivial inference (for a
particular context): a cut-off point for ‘agent i knows that . . . ’. My view is that such
instances of knowledge failure are always indeterminate instances of knowledge
failure. There is never a case in which agent i determinately knows such-and-such,
from which it trivially follows that A, such that it is determinate that i does not
know that A. So, if ‘A’ follows trivially from what agent i determinately knows,
then either i also knows that A, or else it is indeterminate whether i knows that
A.
If this analysis is correct, then our accounts of knowledge should account for
the link between trivial inferences and knowledge, so that determinate epistemic
oversights (that is, cases in which an agent determinately fails to know some
trivial consequence of what she determinately knows) never occur. It is not enough
simply to apply whatever one thinks is the correct theory of vagueness to ‘trivial
inference’ and ‘knows’, for that will not automatically preserve the correct links
between the two notions. Our account of knowledge itself needs to guarantee the
correct link between trivial inferences and knowledge, so that the theory itself
entails that there are no determinate epistemic oversights.
There are various ways of ddling a formal model of knowledge so that it
validates this principle. But by ‘writing in by hand’ the principle we want to
establish, the resulting models take on the appearance of broken furniture held
together by gaffa-tape. Not only is this approach unsightly, it is also liable to break
sooner or later. So this will not be my approach. Rather, I will look to develop
formal models of knowledge with independent motivation (§§4–6). I’ll then show
(§7) that these models validate the correct link between trivial inferences and
indeterminate knowledge. I’ll begin, in the next section, by recasting the problem
of rational knowledge in terms of epistemic possibility, as this is a key notion in
developing adequate epistemic models.
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4 Knowledge and Epistemic Possibility
The most successful framework for modelling knowledge is the worlds-based
account, which began with Hintikka (1962). Each agent i is assigned an epistemic
accessibility relation Ri between worlds. Intuitively, ‘Riwu’ means that world u is
possible, for all i knows at w. As is well-known (and as Hintikka himself realised),
Hintikka’s original proposal suffers from the logical omniscience problem. Agents
are modelled as automatically knowing all consequences of their knowledge (and
hence as automatically knowing all logical truths). As is often remarked, there are
many modelling contexts in which this assumption is harmless (Fagin et al. 1995);
but clearly, it will not do for a general account of knowledge. There are cases in
which we want to model the very features of human resource-bounded reasoning
which are precluded by the possible-worlds approach.
A popular (and, in my view, the only plausible) approach to the issue is to widen
the domain of worlds used in the account, to include some that are not logically
possible. Hintikka (1975), Rantala (1975; 1982), Belnap (1977), Levesque (1984),
Lakemeyer (1986; 1987) and Fagin et al. (1990) take this approach. One could
include worlds analogous to the models of paraconsistent logic, according to
which a sentence may be both true and false (Belnap 1977). With such worlds in
play, modus ponens and disjunctive syllogism are invalid (they do not preserve
truth-according-to-a-world across all words). This makes it possible to model
agents whose knowledge is not closed under classical consequence. (It remains
closed under paraconsistent consequence, however. It is moot just how much of a
problem this is for the approach.)
On this approach, whenever such a world w is classically impossible, it is
trivially impossible: some ‘A’ is both true and false, according to w. Yet if a world
is to enter into epistemic accessibility relations, it must be the kind of world that
an agent could consider as a possibility, given what she knows. In considering a
world w a possibility, in this epistemic sense, an agent is allowing that the actual
world could be like that. But no rational agent considers explicitly contradictory
worlds to be such cases.
When one is in the dark about some purported theorem of analysis – one
doesn’t know whether it’s in fact a theorem or not – that’s because one doesn’t
have a proof or other reliable evidence to hand. So one considers both eventualities
(the purported theorem is/is not in fact a theorem) as genuine options for how
things might in fact be. One thereby considers some mathematically impossible
world to be possible (for if the purported theorem is in fact a theorem, then it is so
by mathematical necessity; similarly if it is not a theorem). One does not thereby
consider some numbers or number-theoretic operators to have contradictory
properties! If asked whether some number is the successor of itself, our agent will
likely answer, ‘of course not!’. If our agent knows that no number is the successor
of itself, then she does not consider as epistemically possible any world according
to which some number is the successor of itself. Similarly for any other trivial
absurdity ‘A’. If (as seems reasonable) our agent knows that it is not the case
that A, then she does not consider as epistemically possible any world according
to which A. But then, the non-classical worlds corresponding to paraconsistent
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models cannot play a role in the model of knowledge.
Our problem, therefore, is not merely to avoid logical omniscience in our
models of knowledge (which we could do easily by including non-deductively-
closed worlds). The problem is to provide a notion of a world which is logically
impossible, but not trivially so. Lewis (in complaining about paraconsistent logic)
puts the point nicely:
I’m increasingly convinced that I can and do reason about impossible situations.
. . . But I don’t really understand how that works. Paraconsistent logic . . .
allows (a limited amount of) reasoning about blatantly impossible situations.
Whereas what I nd myself doing is reasoning about subtly impossible
situations, and rejecting suppositions that lead fairly to blatant impossibilities.
(Lewis 2004, 176)
Lewis allows the theoretical usefulness of ‘make-believedly possible impossibilities’,
whilst noting (correctly) that
The trouble is that all these uses seem to require a distinction between the
subtle ones and the blatant ones (very likely context-dependent, very likely a
matter of degree) and that’s just what I don’t understand. (Lewis 2004, 177)
Hintikka (1975), whilst addressing the logical omniscience problem head-on,
makes a similar point. He argues that, for epistemic purposes, impossible worlds
must be ‘subtly inconsistent’ worlds (1975, 478) which ‘look possible but which
contain hidden contradictions’ (1975, 476).
We’re in a bind. To avoid logical omniscience, we require impossible worlds; to
avoid treating agents as being irrational, we must exclude the trivially impossible
worlds. There’s obviously no clear way to demarcate the obviously impossible
from the subtly impossible worlds.
In previous work (Jago 2009; 2013), my approach to this predicament
was to assign relative degrees of impossibility or epistemic implausibility to
logically impossible worlds. This approach is one way to esh out some ideas
Chalmers (2010) puts forward concerning (what he calls) non-ideal epistemic
space: a space of epistemic possibilities which need not all be a priori consistent.
Chalmers suggests thinking about such possibilities as ones which cannot be ruled
out (alternatively, whose negation cannot be known, or proved, or otherwise
established) ‘through such-and-such amount of a priori reasoning’ (Chalmers
2010, 44).
If such an approach is to be a rational one, it must interact appropriately
with the meanings of the logical constants. My approach was to hold that (i) the
meanings of the logical constants are associated with inference rules for those
constants; but (ii) inference rules may establish normative requirements other than
by closure. They may establish normative requirements in a step-by-step way. By
way of example, rational commitment is a notion for which the inference rules
play a closure role, so that one is rationally committed to all logical consequences
of one’s rational commitments. But things are otherwise when considering rational
epistemic possibility. In this case, the inference rules play a step-by-step normative
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role. Explicitly contradictory worlds are a limiting case of epistemic implausibility,
for they take no inferential effort to recognise as such. The more inferential steps
required to derive an explicit contradiction from what a world represents, the
greater that world’s degree of epistemic plausibility. Logically consistent worlds are
maximally epistemically plausible (even if they are representationally incomplete).
Now for some of the details. I take worlds in general to be ersatz set-theoretic
constructions in some worldmaking language. That language is constructed in the
Lagadonian way (Lewis 1986) with particulars, properties and relations playing
the role of names and predicates, interpreted so as to to self-refer. (I take up the
difcult question of how to referent non-actual particulars and properties in Jago
2012.) A world w is a pair (w+,w−) of sets of worldmaking sentences, where w+
captures what w represents as being the case, and w− captures what w represents
as failing to be the case. Any such pair counts as a world, so that w+ and w−
may overlap (producing representational inconsistency) and may fail to be jointly
exhaustive (producing representational incompleteness).
Worlds so dened have both a worldly nature (they are ultimately constructed
from actual particulars, properties and relations) and a linguistic nature (they
have ne-grained linguistic structure). The former feature circumvents the worry
that the account is ‘purely syntactic’. The latter feature allows us to view a world
w as highly structured sequent, w+ ⊢ w−. In general, a multi-conclusion sequent
Γ ⊢ ∆ says that the Γs cannot all be true whilst all the ∆s are false (Restall 2005;
2008a). Hence a derivable sequent w+ ⊢ w− tells us that world w is logically
impossible. (In this approach, sequents correspond to what Restall (2008a;b)
calls an argument positions, and a world w where w+ ⊢ w− corresponds to an
incoherent position.) Left and right sequent rules, of the form
u+ ⊢ u−
w+ ⊢ w− or u+ ⊢ u− v+ ⊢ v−w+ ⊢ w−
can then be seen as relating worlds together in a normative, proof-theoretic way.
The former kind of rule can be read as: if u is logically impossible, then so is w.
The later kind can be read as: if both u and v are logically impossible, then so is
w.
Not any choice of sequent rules is suitable for our current purpose. Relation-
ships between worlds must be dictated purely by the meanings of the logical
constants, and so we should not employ any sequent rules that are not directly
dictated by the meaning of some logical constant. In general, a sequent calculus
employs logical rules to x the meaning of the logical constants, and structural rules
to give syntactical information about manipulating sequents. This strongly suggests
that we should conne the target system to logical rules only. Moreover, since
worlds are by denition pairs of sets of sentences, we require logical rules which
operate on sets, rather than lists or multisets, of sentences. Given these desiderata,
Kleene’s system G4 (Kleene 2002), without the cut rule, is an ideal choice. This
system has just logical rules plus identity axioms of the form Γ ∪ {A} ⊢ ∆ ∪ {A},
and is sound and complete for classical semantics. Since there is a tight relationship
between the meanings of the logical constants and each of these sequent rules,
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we are entitled to think of the resulting proof structures on worlds as normative,
rational and meaning-governed structures.
Such a structure is a proof when u+ ∩ u− ≠ ∅ for each leaf node u+ ⊢ u−. It is a
proof of the sequent w+ ⊢ w− at its root. The size of the smallest proof of w+ ⊢ w−
tells us just how explicit contradictions in world w are. The larger the structure,
the more deeply buried are those contradictions and so the more epistemically
plausible w is. The rank of a world encodes this feature: w’s rank #w is the size
(the number of nodes) of the smallest proof of w+ ⊢ w−, if there is one, and ω (the
rst limit ordinal) otherwise. In general, w is at least as epistemically plausible as
u when #w ≥ #u. Given what I said above, this notion of epistemic plausibility is
a normative, rational and meaning-governed matter; it is not intended to capture
a psychological notion of obvious triviality (or obvious inconsistency).
This scalable notion of epistemic plausibility stands to epistemic possibility as
height stands to tallness. There is no clear (or determinate, or denite) value of
epistemic plausibility that captures all and only those worlds that are genuinely
epistemically possible, just as there is no clear, determinate height which captures
all and only the tall people. In each case, just where the borderline falls is
indeterminate, unknowable and highly dependent on context. Nevertheless, there
are clear cases of epistemic possibility and clear cases of epistemic impossibility,
and we can theorise accordingly. When (and only when) a world is epistemically
possible, I’ll call it an epistemic scenario. It is then an indeterminate matter just
which worlds count as epistemic scenarios.
We now have a handle (albeit an indeterminate one!) on which worlds count
as epistemic scenarios and so we are on our way to building suitable models of
knowledge. To do so, we must say which scenarios are epistemically accessible to
which agents. This is the topic of the next section.
5 Epistemic Accessibility and Epistemic Oversight
To obtain models of knowledge, given a set of epistemic scenarios, we impose
epistemic accessibility relations on those worlds. In the traditional approach to
such models, on which the worlds are all logically possible, this is a simple matter.
Accessibility relations are primitive characteristics of the model: in specifying the
model, we associate one such relation Ri with each agent i whose knowledge we
are modelling. In our case, however, there is a further subtlety we must consider.
Suppose you consider a hypothetical situation according to which it’s windy
and snowing outside. Does that scenario represent that it’s snowing outside? The
answer seems to be: of course! It is but a short step from here to conclude that,
if a scenario represents that A ∧ B, then it represents both that A and that B,
and vice versa. (After all, there’s nothing special, from the point of view of how
scenarios represent, about the content of ‘it’s windy’ and ‘it’s raining’.) And it is
but a short step from this principle – that what scenarios represent is closed under
conjunction introduction/elimination – to the total deductive closure of what
scenarios represent. After all, conjunction introduction/elimination stand to the
(conjunctive) meaning of ‘and’ just as the other introduction and elimination rules
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stand to the meanings of the other logical connectives. Yet, as we have already
seen, what scenarios represent is not deductively closed. So we must resist this
plausible chain of reasoning somewhere. The point is not so much that we must
employ scenarios which are not deductively closed, but rather that however we
do so will seem counterintuitive, just as drawing some precise cut-off between red
and non-red colour samples does. (Bjerring (2011) uses this point to argue that we
cannot formulate a non-ideal, non-trivial notion of epistemic space. I disagree.)
Our situation is this. We must use scenarios which fail to represent some trivial
consequence of what they represent, such as representing that it’s windy and
snowing without representing that it’s snowing. That’s counterintuitive, because if
we explicitly describe a scenario as one according to which it’s windy and snowing,
it seems clear that the scenario in question also represents that it’s snowing. We
should note that all such cases concern a trivial consequence ‘A’ of what a scenario
represents as being the case, on which the scenario remains silent. The scenario in
question neither represents that A is the case nor that A is not the case. ‘A’ is a
representation-gap for that scenario. For if the scenario represented that A is not
the case (where ‘A’ is a trivial consequence of what that scenario represents as
being the case), then the scenario would be trivially contradictory, and hence not
a scenario after all. So we are considering cases in which a scenario is silent about
some situation which, intuitively, it should represent as being the case.
We can explain the tension in one of two ways. On the rst way, it’s
indeterminate what the scenario in question represents. The indeterminacy is
in the represents relation, holding between scenarios and contents. On the second
explanation, it’s indeterminate which scenario is the scenario in question. The
indeterminacy is in an agent’s epistemic access to scenarios.
Each explanation will resolve the tension because, when an agent describes a
hypothetical scenario, she describes its determinate features only (determinate with
respect to which scenario is under consideration and to what it represents). If it’s
determinate that the scenario in question represents that it’s windy and snowing,
then that scenario does not suffer a representational failure in the deductive
neighbourhood of ‘it’s windy and snowing’. That neighbourhood includes both ‘it’s
windy’ and ‘it’s snowing’. So, whenever an agent describes some scenario, it appears
to be closed under trivial inference. This is compatible with scenario-representation
failing some trivial inference, so long as the failure is not a determinate failure.
This is just the picture I have in mind: it is never determinate that the situation in
question fails to represent some trivial consequence of what it represents.
Which of the two explanations should we adopt? If we’re thinking about
representational entities such as novels, or mental imaginings, then it’s quite likely
that the former explanation is most accurate. But for our purposes in building a
model of epistemic notions, the second explanation seems more appropriate. So
I will continue to treat scenarios as pairs of sets of worldmaking sentences, and
treat the indeterminacy just discussed as indeterminacy in an agent’s epistemic
accessibility relation.
In what follows, I’ll assume that, for each agent, one such relation species
(sharply, precisely) which worlds are accessible from which. But associated with
this accessibility relation is a family of alternative accessibility relations. What is
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true relative to all of these relations is determinately true; what is true relative to
some but not all of these relations is indeterminate. I’ll develop formal epistemic
models along these lines in the next section.
6 Epistemic Models
The aim in this section is to build formal models which capture the ideas discussed
in §4 and §5. First, as we want to reason about determinate and indeterminate
knowledge, we expand the object language L (over primitive sentences P) to
include a determinacy operator ‘△’. ‘△A’ means ‘it is determinate that A is the
case’. We can introduce an indeterminacy operator ‘▽’ by denition:
▽A =df ¬△A∧¬△¬A
with ‘▽A’ read as ‘it is indeterminate whether A is the case’. In the model theory,
states of knowledge will be captured using epistemic projection functions fi, rather
than accessibility relations Ri. Each function fiw gives the set of worlds that
are epistemically accessible from world w for agent i. The projection function fi
captures the accessibility relation Ri such that: Riwu iff u ∈ fiw. Working with
projection functions is merely a convenient notational change.
In §4, I dened worlds as pairs of sets of sentences, (w+,w−). I’ll adopt a
more general approach in the formal models, which will involve arbitrary sets of
entities W P and W I , thought of as sets of possible and impossible worlds (but
which can be any sets we like). I’ll follow standard practise and use labelling
functions V+ and V−, with each assigning a set of sentences to each world. We
think of V+w as the set of sentences which are true according to world w, and
V−w as the set of sentences which are false according to w. Thus, the sets V+w
and V−w correspond to the sets w+ and w− from §4, except that V+w and V−w
are sets of object language sentences (which need not be the special worldmaking
language from §4).
Relative to L (which, I am assuming, is xed throughout), we dene models
and related notions as follows.
Denition 1 (Epistemic model) Let W P and W I be arbitrary sets (thought of as
sets of possible and impossible worlds, respectively), and let W∪ = W P ∪W I .
An epistemic model for k agents is a tuple M = ⟨W P ,W I ,V+,V−, f1, . . . , fk⟩,
where V+ ∶ W∪ Ð→ 2L and V− ∶ W∪ Ð→ 2L are labelling functions, such that
V+w ∪V−w = P when w ∈ W P, and each fi ∶ W∪ Ð→ 2W∪ is an epistemic
projection function.
We carry over our denition of the rank of a world #w from §4:
Denition 2 (Rank) The rank function # ∶ W∪ Ð→ Z+ ∪ {ω} assigns a rank to
each world. #w is the size (number of nodes) in the shortest proof structure
rooted at V+w ⊢ V−w, if there is one, and ω otherwise. The rank of model M is
min{#w ∣ w ∈W∪}.
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To capture the idea that states of knowledge may be indeterminate, we use the
idea from §5 that each accessibility function comes with a family of alternative
accessibility functions. (Together, these act as something like precisications of
the agent’s epistemic states.) Given any accessibility projection function fi in M
and any sentence A ∈ L, we dene f Ai , the A-variant of fi, as follows:
Denition 3 (A-variant of fi)
f Ai w = { (fiw ∩ {w ∣ A ∈ V+w})∪ (fiw ∩W P) if fiw ⊆ {w ∣ A ∉ V−w}fiw otherwise
Let fLi = {fi}∪ {f Ai ∣ A ∈ L}.
Denition 4 (Alternative sequences) For an epistemic model M as above, let αM ={⟨g1⋯ gk⟩ ∣ gi ∈ fLi , i ≤ k}.
I will use the notation ‘g⃗’ to denote alternative sequences (i.e., sequences of
epistemic projection functions) and ‘g⃗i’ to denote the ith function of the sequence
g⃗. Thus, if g⃗ = ⟨gi⋯ gk⟩ then ‘g⃗i’ denotes function gi. We can think of each
alternative sequence g⃗ ∈ αM as a sharpening of ‘epistemic accessibility’ for our
k agents. On this way of thinking, models are dened relative to a particular
sharpening ⟨f1⋯ fk⟩, from which all the others in αM are generated. We think of⟨f1⋯ fk⟩ as the sharpening that gets things right: it tells us what’s true (simpliciter)
in that model, whereas what’s determinately true in that model is a matter of
what is true according to all alternatives in αM. This will allow us to give a
classical denition of truth, on which M ⊩ A or M ⊩ ¬A for all (pointed) models
M. (Alternatively, we could give a supervaluationist-style treatment by dening
models relative to a set of alternative sequences, and dene truth (simpliciter) in
that model as truth on all alternatives. It would still be the case that M ⊩ A∨¬A
but not always that M ⊩ A or M ⊩ ¬A. Theorem 3, the main result of the paper,
would still hold.)
Denition 5 (g⃗-truth and g⃗-falsity) Given an epistemic model M as above and an
alternative sequence g⃗ ∈ αM, we dene g⃗-relative truth and falsity in M, ⊩g⃗ andêg⃗, as follows. (M is implicit in each clause.) For possible worlds w ∈W P :
w ⊩g⃗ p iff p ∈ V+w
w ⊩g⃗ ¬A iff w ⊮g⃗ A
w ⊩g⃗ A∧ B iff w ⊩g⃗ A and w ⊩g⃗ B
w ⊩g⃗ A∨ B iff w ⊩g⃗ A or w ⊩g⃗ B
w ⊩g⃗ A → B iff w ⊮g⃗ A or w ⊩g⃗ B
w ⊩g⃗ KiA iff u ⊩g⃗ A for all u ∈ g⃗iw
w ⊩g⃗ △A iff w ⊩h⃗ A for all h⃗ ∈ αM
w êg⃗ A iff w ⊮g⃗ A
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For impossible worlds w ∈W I :
w ⊩g⃗ A iff A ∈ V+w
w êg⃗ A iff A ∈ V−w
Denition 6 (n-entailment) A pointed model is a pair ⟨M,w⟩where M is as above
and w ∈W P in M. I’ll use the notation ‘Mw’ to abbreviate ‘⟨M,w⟩’. We dene
truth relative to Mw as:
Mw ⊩ A iff w, ⟨f1, . . . , fn⟩ ⊩ A
Mw ⊩ Γ iff Mw ⊩ A for each A ∈ Γ. For any n ∈ Z+ ∪ {ω}, logical n-entailment is
then dened as:
Γ ⊧n A iff, for every pointed model Mw of rank r ≥ n, M ⊩ Γ only if Mw ⊩ A
It is then easy to see that ⊧n extends classical entailment:
Theorem 1 For any n ∈ Z+ ∪ {ω}: if Γ classically entails A, then Γ ⊧n A.
Proof: Suppose Γ ⊭n A. Then there is an epistemic model M, world w ∈ W P
in M and alternative g⃗ ∈ αM such that w ⊩g⃗ B for all B ∈ Γ but w ⊮g⃗ A. Let
v ∶ P Ð→ {true, false} be a classical valuation such that vp = true iff p ∈ V+w in M.
Now extend v for ‘¬’, ‘∧’, ‘∨’ and ‘→’ in the usual way. We show that vC satises
each C ∈ Γ ∪ {¬A} by induction on the complexity of C. If C ∶= p, then p ∈ V+w
hence vp = true. Now assume that, for all C′ ∈ Γ ∪ {¬A} of lower complexity
than C, vC′ = true iff w ⊩g⃗ C′. If C ∶= ¬C1 then w ⊩g⃗ ¬C1, hence w ⊮g⃗ C1 and,
by hypothesis, vC1 = false. Then vC = true. If C ∶= C1 ∧C2, then w ⊩g⃗ C1 and
w ⊩g⃗ C2 and, by hypothesis, vC1 = vC2 = true, hence v(C1 ∧C2) = true. The ‘∨’
and ‘→’ cases are similar. Hence Γ ⊭n A only if Γ ∪ {¬A} is classically satisable,
and theorem 1 follows by contraposition. ∎
With the epistemic models we need dened, we now need to check that they
guarantee the correct contention between trivial inference and (in)determinate
knowledge. This is the topic of the next section.
7 Trivial Inference and Indeterminate Knowledge
In this section, I’ll rst return to the notion of trivial inference (and trivial
consequence). As with the notions of epistemic plausibility and possibility, this is
intended as a normative, rational notion, not a psychological one. I’ll then show
that, with respect to this normative notion and with respect to the epistemic models
just dened, any instance in which an agent fails to know some trivial consequence
of what she knows is an indeterminate instance of knowledge failure. Agents never
determinately fail to know trivial consequences of what they determinately know.
Relative to any precise delineation n of which worlds count as epistemic
scenarios (i.e., such that all and only worlds of rank #w ≥ n count as epistemic
scenarios), we dene A as a trivial consequence of Γ, trivn(Γ,A) as follows.
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Denition 7 (Trivial consequence) With respect to any integer n ∈ Z+ ∪ {ω}, A ∈L is a trivial consequence of Γ ⊆ L, trivn(Γ,A), if and only if, for all pointed
models Mw of rank r > n, Mw ⊩ Γ only if Mw ê A.
As a denition of (a kind of) consequence, this denition is rather unusual: the
clause has ‘Mw ê A’ where we would usually have ‘Mw ⊩ A’. This is because
trivial consequence is not purely about truth-preservation across all epistemic
scenarios. In fact, no inference (other than identity, A ⊢ A) is preserved across all
epistemic scenarios. Rather, a consequence counts as trivial in the current sense
when the truth of the premises guarantee falsity avoidance for the conclusion
across all epistemic scenarios. So, trivn(Γ,A) behaves as a consequence relation
in some ways, but not in others, as the following results highlight.
Theorem 2 trivn has the following properties, for all n ≥ 1 ∈ Z+ ∪ {ω}:
(a) trivn ⊆ trivn+1: if trivn(Γ,A), then trivn+1(Γ,A).
(b) trivn is monotonic: if trivn(Γ,A) and Γ ⊆ ∆ then trivn(∆,A).
(c) trivn(Γ,A) only if Γ classically entails A.
(d) trivn is reexive.
(e) triv1(Γ,A) if and only if A ∈ Γ.
(f) For n > 1, trivn is non-transitive and does not satisfy cut: it is not the case
that if trivn(Γ,A) and trivn(Γ ∪ {A},B) then trivn(Γ,B).
Proof: For (a), suppose that trivn(Γ,A) and that pointed model M has a rank
r > n + 1 s.t. M ⊩ Γ. Then for all M′ of rank r > n s.t. M′ ⊩ Γ, M′ ê A. Hence
M ê A, and so trivn+1(Γ,A). For (b), suppose trivn(Γ,A), Γ ⊆ ∆ and M ⊩ ∆.
Then M ⊩ Γ and so, by denition, M ê A. Hence trivn(∆,A). For (c), suppose Γ
does not classically entail A. Then there is no closed tree in our sequent system
with Γ ⊢ A at its root. Let Mw = ⟨{w},∅,V+,V−, Id1, . . . , Idk⟩ where V+w = Γ,
V−w = {A} and the Idis are identity functions, so that Mw ⊩ Γ and Mw ê A.
Since #w = ω, Mw has rank ω and hence ¬trivn(Γ,A) for any n ≤ ω. (c) follows
by contraposition.
For (d), rst suppose that M has rank r > 1. Then there is no w ∈ W∪ in
M such that A ∈ V+w ∩V−w (since for any such world, #w = 1). Hence if
M ⊩ A then M ê A, and so triv1({A},A). By (b), if A ∈ Γ then triv1(Γ,A)
and, by (a), trivn(Γ,A) for any n ∈ Z+, hence each trivn is reexive. For (e),
the ‘if’ follows from reexivity. For the ‘only if’, suppose A ∉ Γ and let Mw =⟨{w},∅,V+,V−, Id1, . . . , Idk⟩ where V+w = Γ and V−w = {A}. Then Mw ⊩ Γ
and Mw ⊮ A. Since A ∉ Γ, #w > 1, hence Mw has a rank r > 1, hence ¬triv1(Γ,A).
For (f), note that triv1 trivially satises cut. So suppose n > 1 and let Γn = {p1 ∧(p2 ∧ (⋯ ∧ pn)⋯ )}. Then trivn(Γ, pn−1 ∧ pn) and trivn(Γ∪ {pn−1 ∧ pn}, pn), but¬trivn(Γ, pn). For a counterexample, let Mw = ⟨{w},∅,V+,V−, Id1, . . . , Idk⟩
where V+w = Γ and V−w = {pn}. We have Mw ⊩ Γ and Mw ê pn. Since
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#w = n + 1, Mw has rank n + 1 and so ¬trivn(Γ, pn). Hence, for n > 1, trivn
does not satisfy cut. Since cut is a form of transitivity, the argument that trivn is
non-transitive is similar. ∎
So long as n is not too small, the trivial consequences (so dened) include all
the inferences we usually call trivial. For example, we have:
triv2({A∧ B},A) triv3({A,B},A∧ B)
triv2({A},A∨ B) triv4({A∨ B,¬A},B)
triv3({A → B,A},B) triv5({A → B,¬B},¬A)
triv7({¬(A∧ B)},¬A∨¬B) triv7({¬(A∨ B)},¬A∧¬B)
and so on. These are the minimal n-values for which trivn(−,−) holds. For example,¬triv3({A∨ B,¬A},B). To see why, consider a single-world model M such that
V+w = {A∨ B,¬A} and V− = {B}. Then #w = 4 and hence M is of rank 4.
I’ve given a way to differentiate between trivial and non-trivial valid inferences.
I now turn to the main result of the paper, concerning trivial inference, knowledge
and (in)determinacy:
Theorem 3 For any n ∈ Z+ ∪ {ω}, if trivn(Γ,A) then {△KiB ∣ B ∈ Γ} ⊧n¬△¬KiA.
Proof: Assume that trivn(Γ,A) and, for all B ∈ Γ, Mw ⊩ △KiB, where M =⟨W P ,W I ,V+,V−, f⃗ ⟩ and w ∈W P. Then for all B ∈ Γ and all g⃗ ∈ αM, w ⊩g⃗ KiB.
Hence u ⊩g⃗ B, for all for all u ∈ g⃗iw and all B ∈ Γ. Thus, for any u ∈ g⃗iw, Mu ⊩ Γ
and, given trivn(Γ,A), Mu ê A and hence M, u êg⃗ A, for all u ∈ g⃗iw and all
g⃗ ∈ αM . This guarantees that fiw ⊆ {v ∣ A ∉ V−v} and so, by denition 3:
f Ai w = fiw ∩ {v ∣ A ∈ V+v}∪ (fiw ∩W P)
Then, for every world u ∈ f Ai w and alternative h⃗ ∈ αM such that h⃗i = f Ai , M, u ⊩h⃗
A. Since w ∈ W P, this gives us M,w ⊩h⃗ KiA, hence M,w ⊮ f⃗ △¬KiA and so
M,w ⊩ f⃗ ¬△¬KiA. Then Mw ⊩ ¬△¬KiA and so {△KiB ∣ B ∈ Γ} ⊧n ¬△¬KiA. ∎
Corollary 1 For any n ∈ Z+ ∪ {ω}:
(a) If trivn(Γ,A) then {△KiB ∣ B ∈ Γ}∪ {¬KiA} ⊧n ▽KiA.
(b) If n ≥ 3, then ⊧n ¬△¬Ki(A∨¬A) and ¬Ki(A∨¬A) ⊧n ▽Ki(A∨¬A).
Proof: For (a), suppose trivn(Γ,A). Then by theorem 3, {△KiB ∣ B ∈ Γ} ⊧n¬△¬KiA and, since △B ⊧n B, ¬KiA ⊧n ¬△KiA. Hence {△KiB ∣ B ∈ Γ} ∪{¬KiA} ⊧n △¬KiA ∧ ¬△¬KiA and, by denition of ‘▽’, {△KiB ∣ B ∈ Γ} ∪{¬KiA} ⊧n ▽KiA. For (b), suppose (A∨¬A) ∈ V−w in some model Mw. Then
#w ≤ 3 and so M has a rank r ≤ 3. Hence for any pointed model Mw of rank
r > 3, Mw ê A ∨ ¬A and so, for all n ≥ 3, trivn(∅,A ∨ ¬A). By theorem 3,⊧n ¬△¬Ki(A∨¬A). Further, by (a), ¬Ki(A∨¬A) ⊧n ▽Ki(A∨¬A). ∎
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These results are a very pleasing feature of the theory. Theorem 3 then tells us
that, however we choose a precise delineation of ‘epistemic scenario’ and ‘trivial
consequence’, if the inference from Γ to ‘A’ is trivial then determinate knowledge
of Γ entails the agent does not determinately fail to know that A. So if ‘A’ is a
trivial consequence of what agent i knows, then it is never determinate that i fails
to know that A. Equivalently (as the corollary says), if agent i does not know some
trivial consequence ‘A’ of what she knows, then it is indeterminate whether she
knows that ‘A’. So, on the account proposed, there are no determinate epistemic
oversights. Equivalently, each case of an epistemic oversight is an indeterminate
case.
Since what is indeterminate is not rationally assertible, it is then never rational
to assert that agent i suffers from a particular epistemic oversight. If an agent
is not logically omniscient, then we can be sure that she suffers from some
epistemic oversight. Indeed, it is determinate that real-world agents are not logically
omniscient, and hence determinate that real-world agents suffer from epistemic
oversights. But we can never say what they are: we cannot locate them in a rational
agent’s epistemic state. Whenever we focus on a particular trivial consequence ‘A’
of agent i’s knowledge, it is never rational to assert that she does not know that A
(even if that’s the case). Epistemic oversights are elusive, just as counterexamples
to tolerance principles for vague predicates are.
8 Conclusion
For any particular trivial consequence ‘A’ of what a rational agent knows, it is
tempting to say that the agent must also know that A. But we are not likewise
tempted to say that agents know all logical consequences of what they know. My
aim in this paper has been to explain these seemingly conicting features of the
knowledge of rational (but non-ideal) agents.
Epistemic closure principles are very much like tolerance principles for vague
predicates such as ‘greedy’ in this respect. My approach has been to treat the
failure of epistemic closure principles in an analogous way to failures of tolerance
principles for vague predicates. In any sorites case, one must of course deny
the tolerance principle, but one must also explain why the principle seems so
reasonable. When a case a is a counterexample to a tolerance principle for a
predicate ‘F’, it is unknowable and hence not assertible that a is F. We can never
rationally assert any counterexample to the tolerance principle, and this is how
the principle acquires its rational appeal.
In just the same way, to avoid treating real-world agents as being logically
omniscient we must deny the epistemic closure principles. Yet we must also explain
why they seem so reasonable. My answer is that no counterexample to any trivial
closure principle is ever rationally assertible. It is false that agents know all trivial
consequences of what they know. What is true is that agents never determinately
fail to know any trivial consequence of their determinate knowledge. Trivial
inferences never take us from clear cases of knowledge to clear cases of knowledge
failure. So we can never rationally assert any counterexample to the knowledge
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closure principles (§3).
To implement this idea in formal models of knowledge, we require appropriate
notions of an epistemic scenario (§4) and of epistemic accessibility (§5). We can
then build formal models in a more-or-less standard way (§6). According to these
models, there are no determinate instances of epistemic oversights: an agent never
determinately fails to know any trivial consequence of what she determinately
knows (§7). In this way, the formal approach supports the philosophical contention
that epistemic oversights are always elusive.
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